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This study developed a set of hypotheses concerning factors that
influence the use of expatriate managers in international joint ven-
tures’ (IJVs). These hypotheses were tested on a sample drawn from
U.S. firms’ IJVs in Japan. Results from the empirical tests indicate
that the use of expatriate managers is significantly affected by IJV
age and IJV size, but not U.S. firms’ size and R&D intensity.  
INTRODUCTION
In a recent review article published in Journal of Management, Steve
Werner (2002) identified expatriate management as an important area of
research in international management. Expatriate managers serve major roles in
parent firms’ control over foreign subsidiaries, most notably in international
joint ventures (IJVs), which represent a governance mode of international
transactions located between the polar opposites of arms-length deal and those
conducted within firms (Hennart, 1991). In fact, control has been a lasting pop-
ular theme of research in the IJV literature. IJV control is indispensable for a
successful, cooperative IJV relationship. It is an essential component of mana-
gerial functions responsible for ensuring that parent firms’ goals, interests are
met, and deviations from standards are corrected for effective performance out-
comes (Fenwick et al., 1999). Since IJVs operate in diversified and complicat-
ed international business environments, formal control mechanisms in the
forms of standard rules, procedures, and regulations are not viable. Many
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authors observed the important role played by expatriate managers as an effec-
tive informal mechanism of control (Boyacigiller, 1990; Torbiörn, 1994). By
staffing IJVs’ top management positions with a certain level of expatriate man-
agers, parent firms can maintain effective control while meeting the simultane-
ous needs of flexibility and local responsiveness (Torbiörn, 1994; Roth, 1995). 
A review of the literature, however, reveals that expatriate managers are
also associated with a number of serious problems. Studies indicate that expa-
triate managers are very expensive (Swaak, 1995). They suffer from individual
and family adjustment problems (Black, et al., 1991), difficulties in maintain-
ing productive and satisfying social relationship with local people (Clarke and
Hammer, 1995), poor job performance (Harvey, 1985), and a high rate of pre-
mature return (Shay and Tracy, 2002). 
As there are compelling arguments for both using and not using expatri-
ate managers to fill IJVs’ top management positions, it is critical to study fac-
tors that relate to the use of expatriate managers in IJVs. Such studies are essen-
tial for parent firms to identify the appropriate level of expatriate managers. By
identifying the appropriate level of expatriate managers, parent firms can exert
sufficient control over IJVs and avoid the excessive costs that are associated
with expatriate managers. However, in contrast to the expansive literature deal-
ing with the selection, training, compensation, and cross-cultural adjustment of
expatriate managers, there are surprisingly few empirical studies investigating
how the use of expatriate mangers are determined (Gong, 2003). In this study,
we tried to address this issue by developing a set of hypotheses regarding fac-
tors that are related to the use of expatriate managers in IJVs. These hypothe-
ses were tested on 223 IJVs in Japan. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
IJV Control
IJVs represent a governance mode of international transactions located
between the polar opposites of arms-length market contracts and those con-
ducted within firms (Hennart, 1991). They are jointly owned legal entities that
bring together two or more legally distinct firms located in different countries
through the pooling of a portion of their complementary assets. These assets are
typically knowledge-based proprietary assets or intangible assets. They invari-
ably have a tacit nature in that the creation and replication of these assets rely
heavily on learning by doing (Polanyi, 1967). They reside in people who oper-
ate them and are difficult to articulate. The exchange of these assets through an
arm’s length deal is problematic because of contractual hazards, particularly
those associated with asset specificity, resource interdependency, difficult per-
formance measurement, and uncertainty (Williamson, 1996). Because of these
contractual hazards, employing contract for IJVs is “incomplete contracting in
its entirely” (Williamson, 1996, p. 9), potentially leading to extensive ex post
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haggling or complete failure of the IJV relationship (Oxley, 1997). The power
of courts to address these contractual hazards is also limited, given the associ-
ated difficulties in third-party verification (Oxley, 1997). It is especially diffi-
cult in the international arena since countries differ significantly in their legal
systems that protect intellectual property (Mansfield, 2000). Because of diffi-
culties in the legal enforcement over IJVs, the blueprint of contract law is rarely
applied, and instead partner firms are subject to negotiation, compromises, and
third-party arbitration, should conflicts arise. In situations like this, firms have
to align their governance structures with transactions in order to mitigate con-
tractual hazards (Williamson, 1996, p.3). IJV control is a crucial tool that can
be used to protect parent firms’ intangible assets and to ensure IJVs be managed
in ways that are consistent with parent firms’ interests and objectives (Oxley,
1997).
Many argued, however, that IJVs are voluntary inter-firm cooperative
relationships (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Adler, 2001). Cooperation has the poten-
tial to regulate partner firms’ behavior through coordinated, reciprocal forbear-
ance (Buckley and Casson, 1988). It reduces the precise contractual hazards tar-
geted by IJV control (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Adler, 2002). It operates as a more
effective and less costly self-enforcing safeguard against contractual hazard and
may substitute IJV control (Adler, 2001). This raises an important question
regarding whether IJV control is needed at all in a cooperative IJV relationship.
We submit that IJV control is indispensable even in a cooperative IJV relation-
ship. Although cooperation is a necessary complement that overcomes the limit
of IJV control and nourishes IJVs’ success, no one can rely exclusively on
cooperation during IJV evolution (Luo, 2002). IJV control establishes the insti-
tutional framework and organizational setting that guide, nurture, and strength-
ens the course of cooperation. 
Expatriate Managers and IJV Control
According to Max Weber (1946), there are two forms of organizational
control. Firms can either exert formal, bureaucratic control (Perrow, 1972) or
exert informal control through culture and socialization (Boyacigiller 1990;
Fenwick et al., 1999). Formal, bureaucratic control relies on hierarchy and the
use of explicit rules, standards and regulations. Informal control relies on
implicit organization-wide worldview, customs, traditions and oral communi-
cation. Given the diversity in task and institutional environments, IJVs often
face situations that are quite different from their parent firms. Under these cir-
cumstances, standard rules, procedures, and regulations may not be viable
mechanisms of control and parent firms have to rely more on socialization and
organizational culture to exert control over their IJVs (Boyacigiller, 1990;
Torbiörn, 1994). To the extent that the IJVs’ employees are “cultured” and
socialized with an identical worldview, parent firms can expect IJVs to make
similar decisions under similar circumstances (Boyacigiller, 1990). This allows
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for local responsiveness and flexibility while maintaining effective control
(Boyacigiller, 1990). However, it is very expensive and time-consuming to
socialize and to transfer culture to IJVs employees (Boyacigiller, 1990). It is
almost impossible to “culture” and socialize all or most of IJVs’ employees. An
effective alternative is to place expatriates in IJVs’ top management positions
(Boyacigiller, 1990; Torbiörn, 1994). Expatriate managers are more familiar
with parent firms’ culture and control systems. They produce more effective
communication and coordination between IJVs and their parent firms
(Boyacigiller, 1990; Torbiörn, 1994). They participate in IJVs’ daily operations,
interact and communicate routinely with other IJV employees and mangers,
and have full access to both formal and informal flows of information within
IJVs. Through these activities, expatriate managers facilitate superior monitor-
ing of IJVs’ activities and can effectively enforce parent firms’ influences and
serve their purpose of control. 
HYPOTHESES
When MNCs expand into overseas markets, they usually need to operate
in culturally distant locations involve a high degree of uncertainties
(Boyacigiller, 1990; Gong, 2003). Given the role of expatriate managers in
managing uncertainties, expatriate managers have been extensively used as an
effective means to exert control (Black and Gregersen, 1999).  In order to gain
IJV control, one simple solution is to fill all IJVs’ top management positions
with expatriates. This solution, however, is not feasible because of the prohib-
itive costs of expatriate managers (Black, et al., 1991; Swaak, 1995; Shay and
Tracy, 2002). One estimate of the direct costs is three times the domestic salary
plus relocation expense (Birdseye and Hill, 1995). Others suggest that an expa-
triate manager can cost up to 4 times as much as recruiting a local manager in
developed countries, and 8 times as much in developing regions such as Asia
Pacific (Corporate Location, 1999). The indirect costs of expatriate managers
can be even higher. Expatriate managers are often associated with individual
and family adjustment problems (Black, et al., 1991; Clarke and Hammer
1995), difficulties in maintaining productive and satisfying social relationship
with local people (Clarke and Hammer, 1995), poor job performance (Harvey,
1985), and a high rate of premature return (Varner and Palmer, 2002). It is
reported that 20%-70% of expatriates return prematurely from foreign assign-
ments (Varner and Palmer, 2002), a rate much higher than domestic turnover.
These problems have the potential to incur huge indirect costs, such as dam-
aged relations with clients, reduced productivity and efficiencies, lost sales, lost
market share, weakened competitive position, unstable corporate image, and
tarnished corporate reputation (Naumann, 1992). From this perspective, using
expatriates to fill IJVs top management positions can be potentially counter-
productive (Hailey and Lor, 1996).
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Because of the huge costs and other negative aspects that are associated
with expatriate managers, parent firms are motivated to restrict the excessive
use of expatriate managers (Hailey and Lor, 1996). A viable approach is to
strike a balance between fulfilling the need to control and avoiding the huge
costs. Parent firms need to use expatriates to fill IJVs’ top management posi-
tions, but only up to a level that is sufficient to fulfill their need of control. This
implies that the use of managerial expatriates in IJVs will vary with parent
firms’ need to control. If parent firms need more control, more expatriate man-
agers will be used in IJVs. Whereas fewer expatriate managers will be used if
parent firms’ need to control is low. The IJV literature suggests that parent
firms’ need to control, and hence their use of expatriate managers, will be influ-
enced by the following factors:
IJV Age
Age is an important variable in organizational studies. New IJVs are
associated with the “liability of newness” due to the lack of shared values
among new employees, the weak communication paths, the fragile trust
between partner firms, and the uncertainties in the new environments. In deal-
ing with the “liability of newness”, parent firms tend to exert tight control and
have heavy reliance on expatriate managers during the initial stages of IJVs’
evolution (Hosler, 1990). Expatriate managers play major roles in communi-
cating with parent firms. They facilitate the development of cooperation
between partner firms, serve as the agents to transfer parent firms’ norms and
values to IJVs, and help monitor fluctuations in the new environment. Over
time, as systems and practices are imparted and IJVs start to follow the planned
trajectory, expatriate managers’ role will decline (Downes and Thomas, 2000).
As IJV ages, the MNCs will gradually become more proficient in dealing with
a different culture through a learning-by-doing process (Gong, 2003). Further,
an IJV’s longer presence in a host country will also contribute to the formation
of trust relationships with local partners through repeated transactions (Luo,
2002).  These factors, coupled with the prohibitive cost and high failure rate of
expatriate managers, will open doors for hiring more local managers (Shay and
Tracy, 2002). Therefore, IJV age should be negatively related to the use of
expatriate managers in IJVs. Thus:
H1: There is a negative relationship between IJV age and the use of expa-
triate managers. 
R&D Intensity
Previous studies of IJV control often use parent firms’ R&D intensity as
a significant independent variable to explain variations in parent firms’ level of
control (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991). The logic is that
the higher the R&D intensity, the more proprietary assets will be at stake, and
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the more control parent firms need to acquire in order to protect their propri-
etary assets (Hennart, 1991). Following this line of thinking, we expect the use
of expatriate managers to be positively related to parent firms R&D intensity.
Hence:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between parent firms’ R&D
intensity and the use of expatriate managers.
IJV Size
According to transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1996), the
shared investment in IJVs operates as an effective hostage for partner firms.
IJVs’ value depends on the continued operation of IJVs and partner firms’
respective contribution is at best partially redeemable should IJVs cease to
operate (Oxley, 1997). Compared to small IJVs, large IJVs imply that more
resources will be at stake. This constitutes a strong mutual hostage position for
partner firms. The strong mutual hostage position promotes mutual trust,
reduces potential conflicts, stabilizes the cooperative relationship, and limits
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1996, p. 120). Therefore, parent firms of
large IJVs tend to have low need of control. They are expected to use fewer
expatriates to fill IJVs’ top management positions. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between IJV size and the’
use of expatriate managers. 
METHODOLOGY
Toyo Keizei’s data on foreign affiliated firms in Japan (Toyo Keizei,
1991) was used in this study. The data is compiled from publicly available
information and from surveys of senior manager in each foreign-affiliated firm
in Japan (Toyo Keizei, 1991). In this study, we selected manufacturing IJVs
formed between U.S. firms and their local Japanese partners. To make things
simpler, IJVs that have more than two parents were excluded from the sample.
This resulted in a sample of 233 observations. A further step removed IJVs
whose age is less than two years and this reduced the sample size to 223 obser-
vations. Data on U.S. parent firms’ size and R&D intensity were collected from
COMPUSTAT, which is a database compiled by Standard and Poor’s Inc. 
Measurement 
The Use of Expatriate Managers: The use of expatriate managers is
measured by the proportion of expatriate managers in IJVs’ top management
teams, which is calculated by dividing the number of U.S. expatriate managers
by the total number of managers in the IJV’s top management team. 
IJV Age: IJV age is measured by the calendar years from the time the IJV
starts operation to the time the data were collected. 
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Parent firm’s R&D Intensity: R&D intensity is measured by the U.S.
firm’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales.
IJV Size: IJV size is measured by the IJV’s total number of employees. 
Control Variables 
Control variables included parent firms’ size and dummy variables for
IJVs’ industry.  The dummy variable for chemical and allied products industry
is coded one if the IJV operates in chemical and allied industry, and zero oth-
erwise; The dummy variable for computer and electronics industry is coded one
if the IJV operates in the computer and electronics industry, and zero otherwise;
The dummy variable for machinery industry is coded one if the IJV operates in
the machinery industry, and zero otherwise; The dummy variable for other
manufacturing industry is coded one if the IJV operates in paper, food, glass,
ceramics, forestry industries, and etc., and zero otherwise.
RESULTS
Linear regression (OLS) model was used to test the hypotheses. The
model can be specified in the following equation:
Proportion of expatriate  managers = f (IJV age, U.S. firm’s R&D
intensity, IJV size, U.S. firm’s size,
dummy for chemical industry,
dummy for computer and
electronics industry; dummy
for machinery industry)
The dummy variable for the other industry was not entered in this model
since this permits us to treat the other industry as a base case and the effects of
the remaining industries can be measured relative to it. We tested this model on
223 IJVs formed between U.S. companies and their Japanese partners. We per-
formed regression analysis with SPSS and Table 1 presents results from the
regression analysis. This model generated a reasonable R square of 0.154. The
adjusted R square is 0.126. This model’s F statistic is 5.593 with a p value
below the .000 level, which implies that this model significantly predicts the
uses of expatriate managers. The threat of multicollinearity did not exist as evi-
dent by the low VIF values (1.32 – 1.57) and the low condition indexes (1.00 –
7.48).  
As illustrated in Table 1, IJV age is found to be negatively related to the
proportion of expatriate managers, which implies that expatriate managers’ role
declines as IJV matures and they will gradually be replaced by local managers.
IJV size is found to have a negative effect on the proportion of expatriate man-
agers. This is consistent with our hypothesis that big IJV size constitutes a
strong mutual hostage position for partner firms, which leads to the use of
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fewer expatriates in IJVs’ top management teams. Our regression analysis also
generated a significant and negative regression coefficient for the dummy vari-
able for chemical and allied products industry. This suggests that, compared to
IJVs operating in the other manufacturing industry, fewer expatriate managers
will be used in IJVs operating in chemical and allied products industry.
However, the regression coefficients for the dummy variables of machinery
industry and computer and electronics industry are not statistically significant.
This implies that the use of expatriates does not very much among IJVs oper-
ating in machinery industry, computer and electronics industry, and the other
manufacturing industry. 
The results also indicate that  U.S. firms’ R&D intensity and U.S. firms’
size, do not significantly linked up with the proportion of expatriate managers,
which suggests that there is no significant direct relationship between U.S.
firms’ specific characteristics and the use of expatriate managers. 
In sum, this study provides strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not
Hypotheses 2 and 4. 
TABLE 1





IJV age -.174 -2.414 .017
U.S. firm’s R&D intensity -.069 -1.068 .287
IJV size -.190 -2.509 .013
Control variable
U.S. firm’s size -.088 -1.260 .209
Dummy for chemical industry -.180 -2.124 .035
Dummy for com. and electronic industry -.032 -.384 .701
Dummy for machinery industry -.072 -.915 .361
R-square .154
Adj. R-square .126
Model  F statistic 5.593
p-value <.000
As illustrated in Table 1, IJV age is found to be negatively related to the
proportion of expatriate managers, which implies that expatriate managers’ role
declines as IJV matures and they will gradually be replaced by local managers.
IJV size is found to have a negative effect on the proportion of expatriate man-
agers. This is consistent with our hypothesis that big IJV size constitutes a
strong mutual hostage position for partner firms, which leads to the use of
fewer expatriates in IJVs’ top management teams. The results, however, indi-
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cate that U.S. parent firms’ R&D intensity, does not significantly linked up with
the proportion of expatriate managers, which suggests that there is no signifi-
cant direct relationship between U.S. firms’ specific characteristics and the use
of expatriate managers. 
Our regression analysis generated a significant and negative regression
coefficient for the dummy variable for chemical and allied products industry.
This suggests that, compared to IJVs operating in the other manufacturing
industry, fewer expatriate managers will be used in IJVs operating in chemical
and allied products industry. However, the regression coefficients for the
dummy variables of machinery industry and computer and electronics industry
are not statistically significant. This implies that the use of expatriates does not
very much among IJVs operating in machinery industry, computer and elec-
tronics industry, and the other manufacturing industry. 
In sum, this study provides strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not
for Hypotheses 2. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study identified several key variables that influence parent firms’
use of expatriates in IJVs’ top management teams. Except for R&D intensity,
all factors that were hypothesized to impact on the use of expatriate managers
were statistically significant in the expected direction. This study found that
IJV age has a negative effect on the use of expatriate managers. As IJV matures,
expatriate managers’ role in fulfilling parent firms’ purpose of control will
decline and more local managers will be hired to fill the IJV’s top management
positions. IJV size is found to be negatively related to the use of expatriate man-
agers in that large IJVs constitute a strong mutual hostage position for partner
firms and parent firms of large IJVs tend to use fewer expatriates in IJVs’ top
management teams. Our analysis generated an insignificant regression coeffi-
cient for U.S. parent firms’ R&D intensity. 
Among the four industry groups, our analysis found that the use of expa-
triate managers vary significantly between other manufacturing industry and
chemical and allied products industry, but not among machinery industry, com-
puter and electronics industry, and other manufacturing industry. 
The U.S. parent firm’s size was included in this model as a control vari-
able. Previous research suggests that firms’ size is a good indicator of firms’
slack resources. One concern we have is that large U.S. parent firms with more
slack resources may use a disproportionately large number of expatriate man-
agers in their IJVs that may go beyond the need to exert sufficient control.
Results of this empirical test indicate that this concern is groundless. No sig-
nificant relationship is reported between U.S. parent firms’ size and the use of
expatriate managers in IJVs. This might suggest that U.S. parent firms have
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acted in a rational manner. They are not wasting shareholders’ money and using
expatriate manager excessively in their IJVs. They use expatriates to fill IJVs’
top management positions, but only up to a level which is sufficient to exert
control. 
These results also reveal perhaps the most important finding of the cur-
rent study: that it is characteristics of the IJV (such as IJV age and IJV size) and
not parent firm characteristics (e.g. parent firms’ R&D intensity and parent
firms’ size) that determine the use of expatriate managers. This is consistent
with TCE’s argument that the transaction should be the basic unit of analysis
(Williamson, 1996, p.6). Results from this empirical study confirms that it is
the attributes of the transactions (i.e. the IJVs), and not those of the participat-
ing firm as a whole, that determine the mode of governance in IJVs. 
The limitation of this study is that it did not address the influence of coun-
try factors. Country factors such as political risk, cultural distance, government
policy, legal system, and intensity of competition, are exogenous factors that
firms have to consider when penetrating foreign markets. Although restricting
our study to U.S. - Japanese IJVs helps control for variations among different
countries, these country factors may have significant impact on firms’ expatri-
ate policies. This is clearly a useful undertaking for future research.
Finally, since there are only a few empirical studies exist that examine
factors leading to the use of expatriate managers, it is difficult to evaluate and
generalize results from this study in light of findings from previous studies.
Both consistencies and inconsistencies, however, are noticeable. For instance,
this study found that IJV age has a negative effect. This result is consistent with
findings from empirical studies by Boyacigiller (1990) and Harzing (2001), but
contradicts the findings by Gong (2003). IJV size is found to be negatively
related to the use of expatriate managers, which confirms findings from
Boyacigiller (1990) study, but contradict those of Harzing (2001) and Gong
(2003). A careful examination of these studies reveals that there are significant
differences among these studies in terms of both sample, the operationalization
of the concept, and statistical method. The current study used a sample drawn
from manufacturing IJVs’ operated in Japan, which were formed between
American firms and their Japanese partners. An ordinary least square regression
model is employed and the use of expatriate managers was operationalized as
the proportion of expatriate managers in the IJVs’ top management teams.
Boyacigiller (1990) studied the use of expatriate managers in the overseas
branches of a single international bank.  She operationalized the use of expatri-
ate managers as the proportion of expatriate managers. Harzing (2001) studied
2,689 observations that represent subsidiaries located in 48 different countries
and operate in 23 different industries, which are formed by more than 200
MNCs. She used a discrete dependent variable (1 or 0) to depict the choice for
either a expatriate manager or home country nationals at the subsidiaries’ top
management levels (managing directors), and correspondingly a logistic
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regression has been employed to analyze the data. Gong (2003) studied the use
of expatriate managers in Japanese firms’ overseas subsidiaries. Similar to
Harzing’s (2001)’s approach,  he used a discrete dependent variable (1 or 0) to
depict the choice for either a Japanese manager or local country nationals at the
subsidiaries’ top management levels (CEO and subsidiaries’ top management
teams). Gong (2003) also used a logistic regression model to analyze the fac-
tors that leading to the use of expatriate managers. Further, although Gong
claimed that a dummy variable will be used to control the industry factor, it
seem that  such dummy variable has not been entered in the logistic regression
models.
Since significant variations exist in terms of sample, operationaliza-
tion of key concept, and statistical method, meaningful generalization and com-
parison are impossible to conduct among these studies. The inconsistent find-
ings might be results of different samples, different operationalizations, and dif-
ferent statistical methods being employed in these studies, instead of the inher-
ent relationship underlying these factors that leading to the use of expatriate
managers.  To what extend have our findings been affected by different
methodologies are another interesting avenue for further studies.
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